



Departamento de  
Teoría e Historia  
Económica

## **Seminario: Pietro Salmaso (University "Federico II" of Naples)**

04/03/2025

Seminarios 2024-2025

**Título:** Rationalizable Conjectures in Dynamic  
Matching

**Sala:** E22

**Hora:** 12.30

**Resumen:** We study a dynamic two-sided matching market in which agents enter over time and remain in the market until they find a match or time expires. Agents who delay their participation in the market with the aim of getting a better match in the future form conjectures about the allocations that ultimately will occur. We introduce a procedure to restrict the set of agents' conjectures which resembles the game-theoretic notion of rationalizability. We propose a new notion of dynamic stability, supported by agents' rationalizable conjectures. We demonstrate that this notion is always non-empty and provides a refinement of the concept of Dynamic Stability (Doval, 2022).

