



Departamento de  
Teoría e Historia  
Económica

## **Seminario: Ata Atay (Universitat of Barcelona)**

29/03/2022

Seminario 2021-2022

**Título:** "Complementarities in the daycare allocation problem under priorities"

**Sala:** E28

**Hora:** 12:30

**Abstract:** This paper studies the allocation of children to daycare centers in the Community of Madrid. Our objective is two-fold. First, we eliminate distortions in the current mechanism by introducing a preference domain and a priority structure that overcomes setbacks in the current allocation mechanism. Second, we provide a strategy-proof mechanism that selects a stable matching for the daycare allocation problem. To do so, we introduce the Iterative Sorted Deferred Acceptance mechanism. Our mechanism produces the student-optimal stable matching and is strategy-proof. It can also be useful in the allocation of bundles of goods that are strongly complementary for most agents.

