



Departamento de  
Teoría e Historia  
Económica

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**Título:** On Reaching Social Consent

**Sala:** E28

**Hora:** 12:30

**Abstract:** In a model of group identification, we seek to relatively evaluate agents' opinions on who belong to a given group. Our main concerns are captured by two new axioms in this setting, dubbed separability and individual monotonicity. We study first the dichotomous setting, in which the membership decision is restricted to be 1 (member) or 0 (non-member). Therein we show that the two axioms, combined with symmetry, characterize the family of consent rules. This result strengthens a characterization of the same rules by Samet and Schmeidler (2003). We then shift attention to the general setting where the membership decision can be any value in  $[0,1]$ . We show that, in such a setting, the same three axioms characterize a much richer family that we call generalized consent rules. Those rules extend the spirit underlying the consent rules to the general model, while keeping the issue of relative evaluation in focus.

