Title: Planting Tree Game under Loss Averse Landowners: an Evolutionary approach
Room: E22
Time: 12:30
Abstract: The coordination of planting decisions in neighbour lands can promote
biodiversity enrichment, but with the risk of getting biological damage
that could worsen the economic value of the land. In this paper,
we focus on the landowners’ decisions to either plant a trees or not,
under the presence of two potential scenarios: one where there is a
biodiversity expansion or, another, where pest/disease occurs. This
decision environment is extended to a game between two landowners.
Additionally, we will stress the variables of the game to reach a 2 × 2
game, where both joint planting and joint not planting become the
two (pure strategy) Nash equilibria. After characterising them with
the concepts of pay-off, risk and loss dominance; we will extend the
game to a repeated one, with the goal of understanding the stochastic
stability equilibrium. Some analysis with respect to the parameters of
the game will be applied to explore whether landowners can be induced
to coordinate their planting decisions.