Title: Presentation of the paper: Flow methods for cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration
Room: E22
Time: 10:30
Abstract: This paper introduces the class of cooperative games with generalized
coalition configuration. This new class of games corresponds to cooperative
games with coalition configuration and restricted cooperation. A coalition
configuration is a collection of coalitions covering the agent set. The restriction
of cooperation between agents is represented by a set system for each element
of the coalition configuration. A coalition profile is a list of feasible coalitions,
one for each element of the coalition configuration. A coalition profile function
associates a worth with each coalition profile. Based on this framework, we define
and axiomatically characterize marginal values whose coefficients induce a
unitary flow on the product digraph obtained from these set systems. Next, we
propose a two-step procedure, inspired by Owen’s procedure, to construct flow
methods as above. Then, we show that the associated flow is decomposable
into two flows. Finally, we use two axioms to characterize the flows that can
be decomposed in this way, and hence the flow methods constructed using our
procedure.